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CAUSAL RELATION IN LEGAL LIABILITY-IN TORT* 
LEON GREEN 
The composition of a case in tort is more complex than has 
been generally supposed. The assumption by courts and legal 
writers that a tort is made up only of the elements of wrong- 
doing, causal connection and damage has led to no end of con- 
fusion in the development of this branch of the law. While the 
causal relation and damage elements are acceptable and usable 
terms, the so-called wrongdoing element is too comprehensive, 
and tends to obscure the real process to which a supposedly tort 
case must be subjected before responsibility can be determined. 
The stubborn unity of a tort case demands a more searching 
analysis than this term affords, and as desirable as simplicity 
may be, it is disastrous to clear thinking and the law's develop- 
ment to crowd too many concepts into an expansible catchword. 
In any tort case all of the following inquiries arise. Any one 
or more of them may present difficult problems. But it is 
seldom that more than one or two of them give trouble in 
a particular case. 
(1) Is the plaintiff's interest protected by law, i. e., does the 
plaintiff have a right? 
(2) Is the plaintiff's interest protected against the particular 
hazard encountered? 1 
(a) What rule (principle) of law protects the plaintiff's 
interest? 
(b) Does the hazard encountered fall within the limits of 
the protection afforded by the rule? 
(3) Did the defendant's conduct violate the rule which pro- 
tects the plaintiff's interest? la 
(4) Did the defendant's violation of such rule cause the 
plaintiff's damages? 
(5) What are the plaintiff's damages? 
Phrased in terms of requisites, a tort comprehends: (1) an 
* This article is the introductory chapter of a book now in preparation 
by the writer, to be published by Vernon Law Book Company. 
1This inquiry presents several phases, and further subdivisions might 
well be added as follows: 
(c) Does the plaintiff's conduct defeat the protection afforded? 
(1) consent; (2) contributory negligence; (3) assumed risk. 
(d) Is the defendant's conduct privileged? 
But in order not to encumber the analysis with too great detail, consider- 
ation of these is omitted. 
la The term "wrongdoing" is not objectionable if used only to indicate 
the quality of the defendant's conduct, and whenever used hereinafter will 
be restricted to this meaning. 
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interest protected; (2) against the particular hazard incurred; 
(3) by some rule of law; (4) which the defendant's conduct 
violated; (5) thereby causing; (6) damages to the plaintiff. 
These inquiries or requisites are stated in the order of their 
seeming importance rather than in the order they would be 
considered procedurally, though the differences are minor ones. 
They will be considered, as far as possible, separately, and in 
dealing with each, for the purposes of making it decisive of any 
particular case, it will be necessary to assume that all the other 
inquiries would be concluded favorably to the complaining party 
if they were reached. 
It will be observed that the first two of these inquiries are prob- 
lems for the court, while the last three are primarily for the 
jury-so-called questions of law as opposed to questions of fact. 
As will be developed later the apportionment of these problems 
in some cases to judge and jury is a source of considerable dif- 
ficulty and accounts for many serious blunders. 
It is well enough to state in advance that the first and second 
inquiries are of prime importance. Broadly speaking, little at- 
tention has been given to them and while they are pertinent to 
every case, they have remained largely inarticulate or else have 
been confused with the relatively minor fact problems of the 
quality of the defendant's conduct, causal connection and dam- 
ages, represented by the last three inquiries. Especially has 
the latter been done with regard to the problem of causation. 
Although it is at all times and in all cases a pure question of 
fact-the simplest element of legal liability-the abortive efforts 
which have been made to solve the inquiries of prime importance 
in terms of causal connection cannot be exaggerated. The de- 
plorable expenditure and stupendous waste of judicial energy 
which has been employed in converting this simple problem into 
an insoluble riddle beggars description. Only by a patient proc- 
ess of eliminative analysis can the rubbish of literally thousands 
of cases be cleared away. 
IS THE INTEREST PROTECTED 
The interests protected by rules of law classified under the 
general head of Torts are numerous. They include all those 
rights of personality, rights of property and rights of economic 
advantage and opportunity which in turn form the basis of 
further classification under the familiar catch-words of assault, 
battery, false imprisonment, negligence, trespass, conversion, 
fraud and deceit, malicious prosecution, slander and libel and 
interference with advantageous relations in numberless vari- 
ations. Even this is not a complete classification. Additional 
claims, wants or desires (which may be termed interests) of 
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individuals or groups have from time to time been recognized 
by being given protection, and when so recognized became rights 
subject to classification under the headings indicated. This 
process still continues. The recognition of these interests is one 
of the most important functions of courts. But in any given 
case whether an interest shall be given recognition seldom pre- 
sents itself with boldness. Most frequently the complaining 
party invokes some well established rule as affording protection 
to his injured interest and the court merely extends the rule to 
cover the interest involved. Thus the law grows. Most inter- 
ests to which the law gives protection are well recognized.2 
The interests of importance to which the law refuses protection 
altogether are very few. On the other hand, the fullest degree 
of protection is rarely, if ever, extended to any interest. Con- 
sequently at the foundation of every lawsuit this problem of 
interests must necessarily arise. It offers no difficulty except in 
those cases where the claim to recognition is not well settled. 
In the following cases the solution of this problem was decisive, 
but most of the opinions give no indication that it was recognized. 
In Drobner v. Peters,3 recovery was sought for injuries negli- 
gently inflicted upon a child before birth. The question was 
whether the interest asserted is protected by law. The court 
denied recovery on the ground that the defendant owed no duty 
of care to the unborn child with reference to its bodily welfare. 
In short, the child had no right to freedom from bodily harm.4 
The determination of this inquiry disposed of the case. It was 
unnecessary to inquire whether the defendant was negligent or 
otherwise a wrongdoer, what the damage was, or whether there 
was a causal relation between the two. 
In Wilson v. Brown,5 recovery was sought by children against 
their stepfather for the killing of their mother. It was denied 
because no recognition of such an interest was given at common 
law and the statute permitting a recovery for injuries resulting 
from death by wrongful act did not cover such a case inasmuch 
as the mother, if she had lived, could have had no protection by 
way of damages against her husband, the defendant, for the 
bodily harm inflicted upon her. A like result would follow in a 
suit by a child to recover against a third person for seducing its 
mother, thereby bringing disgrace upon it and its family name. 
The law gives no protection to such an interest. 
In Stiffler v. Boehm,6 the plaintiff sought to recover damages 
against the defendant for enticing away and alienating the affec- 
2 CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924) 60. 
3232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921). 4 Although it was conceded that an unborn child is given protection as 
to its property interests. 
5154 S. W. 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913). 
6 124 Misc. 55, 206 N. Y. Supp. 187 (1924). 
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tions of the plaintiff's fiancee, thereby causing a breach of con- 
tract to marry. Recovery was denied. The only basis for such 
a decision is that no recognition is given the interest the suitor 
may have in such a relation. No protection is afforded against 
the risk of another's interference in such matters, whatever the 
motive may be. This is true even though the third person de- 
bauches or seduces the promised wife.7 
Likewise, a minor child is denied recovery for personal in- 
juries caused by the negligence of a parent.8 But, under the 
interpretation of a statute affecting the status of married women 
to contract, it has been held that a wife may sue her husband for 
assault and battery,9 and even for personal injuries caused by his 
negligence, thus giving recognition to an interest theretofore 
denied under the common law.10 Very similar statutes have 
been construed otherwise." 
In a suit for damages because of the failure to deliver a death 
message preventing the sendee from attending the funeral of a 
near relative, the important question for determination is 
whether the plaintiff's interest is recognized and protected by the 
law of the particular jurisdiction.l2 
In Pasley v. Freeman,13 the defendant, intending to deceive 
the plaintiff, falsely represented to him that certain persons were 
entitled to credit in the purchase of goods. Relying on the 
representations, the plaintiff extended the credit but the pur- 
chasers were unreliable and unable to pay. The plaintiff sought 
to hold the defendant for the loss suffered. The court's problem 
was to determine whether the plaintiff's interest was protected. 
The court so held, and the law of deceit was greatly expanded 
and enriched. 
In Lumley v. Gye,14 the defendant interfered with a contract 
relation between the plaintiff and Miss Wagner under which the 
latter was engaged to perform at the plaintiff's theatre. The 
question was whether there was any protection for an interest 
of this nature. The court held there was, and protection given 
this sort of interest has been expanded enormously as a result 
of the decision. 
7 Davis v. Condit, 124 Minn. 365, 144 N. W. 1089 (1914); see (1925) 10 
CORN. L. Q. 259; (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 229; Homan v. Hall, 102 Neb. 
70, 165 N. W. 881 (1917); Ablerman v. Holman, 208 N. W. 889 (Wis. 1926). 
8 Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923). 
9 Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 206 (1920). 
1o Bushnell v. Bushnell, 131 Atl. 432 (Conn. 1925); Roberts v. Roberts, 
185 N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923); see (1925) 38 HARV. L. REV. 383. 
11 Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 Sup. Ct. 111 (1910). 
12 Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa, 752, 62 N. W. 1 (1895); 
see 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY (1906) 474. 
133 D. & E. 51 (K. B. 1789). 
142 El. & Bl. 215 (Q. B. 1853). 
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In Chasemore v. Richards,15 it was held that one land owner 
had no protection against another who should draw off or inter- 
cept subterranean or percolating waters, and this is the orthodox 
common law rule. Other courts have extended protection to 
such an interest.16 
On the other hand, in Rylands v. Fletcher,17 it was held that 
a landowner may recover against a neighbor who brings upon his 
land dangerous agencies which may escape and do harm to the 
adjoining premises. In this case there was a large reservoir of 
water stored by Rylands which escaped and flooded Fletcher's 
mines. Protection was extended to the plaintiff's interest ir- 
respective of negligence on the part of the defendant. The rule 
is not universally accepted.18 
In Ashby v. White,19 the plaintiff brought an action for being 
deprived of his vote. Whether his interest in exercising this 
privilege of citizenship was to be given the law's protection was 
the only issue involved, but the judges successfully submerged 
it with minor considerations. The political complexion of the 
House of Lords finally gave it the law's recognition. 
In an action for damages on account of fraudulent representa- 
tions whereby the plaintiff has purchased land or goods, some 
courts restrict the damages to the difference between the market 
value and the price paid. Other courts allow the difference 
between the value of the property when purchased and its value 
if the property had been what it was represented to be. In 
the one case the plaintiff's interest in a good bargain is refused 
protection.20 In the other, protection is given.21 
Many of these cases are landmarks in the law of Torts. They, 
and others like them, represent big steps in the growth of the 
law. The problem was the same in all of them. Its recogni- 
tion and determination was decisive. Considerations of damage, 
cause and excuses would have been wholly impertinent until this 
point was settled. 
There are numerous cases like these.22 Under whatever guise 
such a problem may present itself in the first instance, its recog- 
nition and favorable determination for the plaintiff marks an 
outpost of the law, one of the limits to which the law has de- 
veloped. Of course, how a court shall know the solution of 
157 H. L. Cas. 349 (1859). 
16 Meeker v. East Orange, 77 N. J. L. 623, 74 Atl. 379 (1909). 17 L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868). 
18 See Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1911) 59 U. PA. L. REV. 
298, 373, 423. 
19 2 Ld. Raym. 938 (K. B. 1703). 
20 Smith v. Bolles, 132 U. S. 125, 10 Sup. Ct. 39 (1889); George v. Hesse, 
100 Tex. 44, 93 S. W. 107 (1906). 21 Morse v. Hutchins, 102 Mass. 439 (1869). 22 Edison v. Edison Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392 (1907); Roberson 
v. Rochester Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902). 
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such a problem when recognized is an inquiry which involves 
the highest law-making function. Let it suffice at this point 
that the problem is an open one in every case and is not soluble 
by any a priori formula. 
THE LIMITS OF PROTECTION 
It will be observed that the second inquiry (Is the plaintiff's 
interest protected against the particular hazard encountered) is 
but a particularization of the more general inquiry of the pre- 
ceding section. It presents the same kind of problem except that 
it is more complex and arises with greater frequency. It is 
believed to demand more of the judicial function than any other 
problem involved in the administration of justice. The law 
never gives complete or absolute protection to any interest. The 
problem therefore is in any case whether the particular hazard 
falls within the radius of protection thrown about the interest. 
It will readily appear that the inquiry is neither single nor 
simple. First, it is necessary to know what rule or rules of law 
protect the injured interest. The plaintiff usually determines 
this by invoking some rule which protects the interest. It may 
or may not be an appropriate one. If for any reason the 
plaintiff should not invoke a rule appropriate for vindicating 
the injury, his mistake would be a fatal one under most systems 
of pleading. This phase of the problem would always present 
itself as a pleading problem if pleading were an exact process. 
But pleading, when rightly considered, being only a preliminary 
process by way of introducing a case to the court, it is conceiv- 
able that this sort of blunder may not become apparent until 
after the case had been fully developed. Under liberalized sys- 
tems of pleading there is slight occasion for denying relief to 
a party who has merely invoked the wrong remedy or who has 
mistaken the theory of his action. 
But assuming that the most efficacious rule of law for vindi- 
cating a particular interest which has been injured by the hazard 
of the defendant's conduct has been invoked, or that the court 
gives the plaintiff the benefit of such rule, the difficulties have 
only begun. The hazards to which any interest is subjected are 
so numerous, and the reach of any rule which the plaintiff may 
invoke in its vindication is so poorly defined, and there are so 
few external guides to tell a court whether a particular hazard 
is within the range of the rule invoked, that the problem may 
well prove bewildering. Nevertheless, the court must determine 
it in every case, consciously or otherwise. The judicial power 
cannot function in any other way. It is a problem solely for 
the judge and the jury has no part to play in its determination. 
It is at this point that the law-making function of courts is most 
frequently employed. It is here that the great bulk of what we 
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call law-the aggregate of legal rules with their limitations-is 
built up. Just as the courts extend the law in the recognition 
of interests which have been thought to be worthy of the law's 
protection, so in defining the limits of that protection they exer- 
cise an equally expansive power. And the process is applicable 
to interests recognized by legislative authority in exactly the 
same manner. An interest having been recognized as worthy 
of protection, how much protection shall it be given? Against 
what risks shall it be protected? What are the limits of the rule 
invoked? Does the rule afford protection against the hazard 
which has produced the injury? This is the exact inquiry. The 
rule, therefore, must be explored, surveyed, bounded, before the 
inquiry can be answered. Fortunately, or unfortunately, there 
is no way in a developing society by which this inquiry can be 
determined in advance of the particular transaction which calls 
for the application of the rule. The rule is a general principle, 
without bounds, until judicial determination of particular cases 
gives it such. Even then, it is never definitely bounded, for in 
the next case the boundaries may be shifted one way or the 
other by the fixing of an outlying point at a slightly different 
location. The most thoroughly explored and developed rule is 
without exact boundary and since conflicts between the multi- 
tudes of interests now recognized, as well as those being given 
recognition from time to time, are constantly arising, the bound- 
aries of the rules which protect such interests are subject to 
constant readjustment. In making such adjustments, and in the 
recognition of risks as falling within the bounds of those rules, 
the courts fashion the law. There are numerous cases in which 
it is clear that the court did not recognize the problem as being 
a decisive one, or if recognized, it was not candidly met. The 
attempts which have been made to translate this problem into 
terms of causation and damage have not made the solution any 
easier; on the other hand, they have greatly obscured the prob- 
lem. An attempt is here made to analyze and discuss a large 
number of what have been thought to be difficult cases in order 
to indicate the path which it is believed leads to a rational con- 
ception of the problem and its solution. 
In Bird v. Jones,23 the defendant erected seats across a public 
highway which was enclosed for a boat race. The plaintiff was 
prevented from passing into the enclosure and along the highway 
by agents of the defendant. He sought to recover under the 
theory of false imprisonment. A divided court held that he had 
no protection under the rule invoked,24 though he might have 
had under another rule. 
23 7 Q. B. 742 (1845). 
24 Under a Texas statute such a partial obstruction of one's right of 
freedom from interference with his choice of location is so protected. Penal 
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In Derry v. Peek,25 the plaintiff sought to hold the directors 
of a certain company liable in damages for fraudulent represen- 
tations which induced the plaintiff to purchase shares in the 
company. The defense was that the representations were made 
in good faith and upon reasonable grounds. The court was 
called upon to determine whether the rule invoked gave protec- 
tion against representations made in good faith. It held not 
and thereby limited the boundaries of deceit to actual fraud as 
distinguished from innocent misrepresentation. Other courts 
have not so defined the boundaries of the rule.26 
In Swift v. Rounds,27 the defendant bought goods of the 
plaintiff on credit. Nothing was said by the defendant on the 
subject of his ability or intention to pay for them. The plaintiff 
sought to recover on the basis of deceit, alleging that the defend- 
ant's application to purchase was a representation that he in- 
tended to pay, when in fact he had no such intention, but 
fraudulently intended to cheat the plaintiff out of the value of 
such goods. The court's problem here was to determine whether 
the plaintiff's interest was within the protection of the particular 
rule of law invoked. The court so held and thereby extended 
the protection given against such risks by the action for deceit. 
In Fottler v. Moseley,28 the defendant, in order to induce the 
plaintiff not to sell his stock in a certain company, represented 
that certain sales being made on the market were bona fide. 
The plaintiff held his stock and an officer of the company em- 
bezzled a large amount of the funds of the corporation and 
absconded. The plaintiff sought to recover the loss in value of 
his stock caused by the defalcation of such officer, and the prin- 
cipal question involved was whether this was a risk incurred by 
the defendant by reason of his conduct. Was the plaintiff's 
interest protected against such a risk as this? The court held 
that it was. 
In Work v. Campbell,29 the plaintiff sought to recover in an 
action of deceit against the defendant for having made false 
charges against her husband on account of which the plaintiff 
separated from her husband and caused him to leave the country. 
The problem was to determine whether her interest was pro- 
tected against such a risk, and the court held that it was. 
In Wells v. Cook,30 the plaintiff, as agent of his brother, pur- 
Code 1895, art. 618; Gold v. Campbell, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 269, 117 S. W. 
463 (1909). 
25 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889). 
26 Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 117 N. W. 581 (1908); French Piano 
Co. v. Gibbons, 180 S. W. 1185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915). 
2719 R. I. 527, 35 Atl. 45 (1896). 
28 185 Mass. 563, 70 N. E. 1040 (1904). 
29164 Calif. 343, 128 Pac. 943 (1912). 
3016 Ohio St. 67 (1865). 
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chased sheep from the defendant who represented them sound 
and healthy. The plaintiff later purchased all of his brother's 
sheep including those received from the defendant. Due to the 
diseased condition of the sheep purchased from the defendant, 
the entire flock became infected. The plaintiff sought to recover 
damages of the defendant in an action of deceit. The court 
denied recovery on the ground that the misrepresentation was 
not made to the plaintiff. The protection of the rule at the basis 
of deceit was not extended to cover a hazard of this sort. The 
court said: 31 "It is simply impossible that municipal law should 
take cognizance of all these consequences. ... If this limit 
is to be extended it must be the work of the legislature." The 
problem was not one of causation for which it has been so often 
mistaken, but one of defining the boundaries of the rule invoked.32 
In Wetmore v. Mellinger,3 the plaintiff sued the defendant for 
having maliciously prosecuted a civil action against the plaintiff. 
No recovery was allowed. The interest which one has in not 
being harassed by a civil suit is not protected except there be 
a special injury to person or property. Under the orthodox 
rule a defendant runs no risk in such a case save the payment 
of court costs.34 But some courts extend additional protection 
to such an interest against this risk.35 
The common law of England gave no protection to a woman 
against verbal imputations of unchastity, unless such imputa- 
tions fell within the narrow categories for which an action for 
slander would lie generally. In Cooper v. Seaverns,36 the Kansas 
court in such a case chose to expand the rule so as to protect 
such interest fully. The Texas court did the same thing by 
invoking an article of the Penal Code.37 
In Schoepflin v. Coffey,38 the plaintiff sought to recover dam- 
ages for both slander and libel. It was held that the words 
spoken were not actionable per se, that is, the interest of the 
plaintiff was not protected against such a risk in the absence 
of further facts, to wit, special damages. In the libel action it 
appeared that the words spoken by the defendant had been pub- 
31 At 74. 
32 For further delineation of the rule, see Tindle v. Birkett, 171 N. Y. 
520, 64 N. E. 210 (1902); Hindman v. First Nat'l Bank, 112 Fed. 931 
(C. C. A 6th, 1902). The same problem, though involving very different 
circumstances, is present in Enfield v. Colburn, 63 N. H. 218 (1884). 
3364 Iowa, 741, 18 N. W. 870 (1884). 
34Pye v. Cardwell, 110 Tex. 572, 222 S. W. 153 (1920). Inability to 
recover against witnesses who have given perjured testimony presents a 
similar situation. Hocker v. Coelti, 239 Ill. App. 392 (1926); see 24 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 265. 
35 Eastin v. Stockton Bank, 66 Calif. 123, 4 Pac. 1106 (1884). 
36 81 Kan. 267, 105 Pac. 509 (1909). 
37 Hatcher v. Range, 98 Tex. 85, 81 S. W. 289 (1904). 
38162 N. Y. 12, 56 N. E. 502 (1900). 
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lished in a newspaper by parties who heard the words spoken, 
but that the defendant had nothing to do with such publication. 
Recovery was denied in this action for lack of "proximate" 
cause. The real basis for denying recovery is that the rule at 
the basis of an action for libel affords no protection against 
the risk of a voluntary repetition of the defamatory statement. 
Such rule of law does not depend upon causal relation, but is 
based upon the court's determination of sound policy. The 
courts have so restricted the operation of the rule as a matter 
of law. Many factors aside from causal relation entered into 
its delimitation. 
In Vicars v. Wilcocks,39 the defendant, in order to procure the 
plaintiff's discharge, wrongfully accused him of having cut cer- 
tain cordage of his employer. The accusation fell short of charg- 
ing a crime. Having been discharged, the plaintiff sought to 
recover against the defendant for his wrongful discharge in an 
action of slander. The court denied recovery because not a 
"natural consequence" of the defendant's wrong. This is not 
sound. Causal connection was both actual and "natural." But 
the court thought that to give a recovery would expand the action 
of slander beyond reasonable bounds. The result of the decision 
is that protection was denied the interest of the plaintiff; the 
risk is not one within the protection of the rule at the founda- 
tion of an action of slander. This early decision has stunted 
the growth of the action for slander and embarrassed the de- 
velopment of legal liability generally. 
In Lynch v. Knight,40 the wife, joined by her husband, brought 
suit against the defendant for having uttered such base defama- 
tory remarks about her that her husband put her away. Re- 
covery was denied because the special damage was insufficient; 
the action of the husband in putting her away was not a reason- 
able consequence of the slander. No such reasons are sustain- 
able. The court simply refused to extend the protection of the 
rule of law to cover such a risk. The plaintiff's interest was 
not thought to be entitled to protection against this sort of risk.41 
In the widely known "squib case" 42 the sole problem was 
whether a recovery could be based upon the legal concept under- 
lying trespass-was such an injury protected against by the 
rule of law invoked by the plaintiff? The majority held that 
the plaintiff's interest fell within the protection of this rule. 
Blackstone, J., held that another rule-that upon which the 
action on the case is based-was the appropriate rule. Causal 
398 East, 1 (K. B. 1806). 
409 H. L. Cas. 577 (1861). 
41 But see Davies v. Solomon, L. R. 7 Q. B. 112 (1871). 
42 Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Wm. Blackstone, 892 (C. P. 1773). 
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relation so frequently asserted to have been an issue in this case 
was not an issue; it obtained under either theory.43 
In Hollenbeck v. Johnson,44 the defendant's cow had in some 
way escaped from the owner's enclosure without his fault and 
strayed into the plaintiff's barn and crushed in the floor which 
covered a cistern located beneath the floor. Without any fault 
of his own, the plaintiff fell into this hole and sustained the 
injuries for which he sought recovery. The court held the dam- 
ages to the plaintiff too "remote" and not "proximately" con- 
nected with the trespass of the defendant's cow-a strange 
conception of causal relation. The plaintiff relied on the rule 
of law which protects a property owner from injury to his 
property by trespass of a domestic animal having no known 
harmful propensities. He invoked the correct rule for his prop- 
erty damage and the court so held, but it could not be made the 
basis of recovery for his bodily injuries. Damages to this in- 
terest were remote only in the sense that the rule of law invoked 
did not protect it against such a hazard. The interest a person 
has in his bodily security is not fully protected. Conversely, a 
person is not absolutely responsible to others for all injuries 
caused by the activities either of himself or of his animals. 
In the following cases, while negligence in some of them lay 
at the foundation of the action, still it was removed as an issue 
either because a violation of a statute was involved or else be- 
cause negligence was admitted. It will be observed that where 
negligence is not an issue there is not any great difficulty with 
the problem. On the other hand, wherever negligence is an 
issue and must be determined there is likely to be confusion. 
In Gardner v. Cumberland Tel. Co.,45 the defendant negli- 
gently delivered a telegram to the plaintiff advising him that his 
brother was dead. His brother was not dead, and the telegram 
was to another person of the same name. The plaintiff sought 
to recover on the ground of negligence for the mental anguish 
caused him. Recovery was denied on the ground that the plain- 
tiff was not a party to the contract. The rationale of the decision 
is that such an interest is not fully protected; the risk here in- 
volved is not one within the rule invoked. Here the problem 
stood out boldly but the court apparently did not see it. It is 
similar to those cases in which a statute has been violated and 
the question is whether the statute covers the hazard en- 
countered.46 
43 Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) is the same type 
of case. 
44 79 Hun, 499 (N. Y. App. Div. 4th Dept. 1894). 
45 207 Ky. 249, 268 S. W. 1108 (1925). 
46 See (1926) 4 TEX. L. REV. 270; Dickson v. Reuter's Tel. Co., 3 C. P. D. 
1 (1877). 
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In Hines v. Morrow,47 the plaintiff predicated negligence upon 
the failure of the defendant to keep a crossing in proper repair. 
The duty was statutory and owed to the plaintiff as a traveller 
on the public highway. The plaintiff, who had a wooden leg, 
was assisting the driver of a truck in pulling an automobile out 
of a mud hole in the highway at a point where it crossed the 
right-of-way. He knelt down to tie one end of the rope to the 
axle of the truck while the owner was tying it to the bogged car. 
When the plaintiff arose he gave the truck driver the signal to 
go ahead and started to step from between the two cars. He 
stepped into an unobservable hole with his wooden leg and, being 
unable to extricate himself by his own strength and realizing 
his peril, he caught the back end of the truck, expecting to be 
pulled out by holding on to the truck. As he did this the slack 
in the rope became entwined around his sound leg and broke it 
at the ankle so as to require amputation. The defense was that 
the consequence could not be foreseen and was therefore not 
proximate. This was not the issue. The only problem was 
whether this risk fell within the radius of the rule which the 
plaintiff relied upon, i.e., the defendant's duty to keep the cross- 
ing in proper repair, and which admittedly had been violated by 
the defendant. A recovery was allowed, but had the issue of 
negligence itself been a contestable one, the result would prob- 
ably have been different. 
In Krach v. Heilman,48 the plaintiff sought to recover for the 
death of her husband to whom the defendant had furnished in- 
toxicating liquor contrary to a statute. It appeared that the 
plaintiff's husband became drunk and unable to take care of him- 
self and that in going home, while lying down in his wagon, 
a barrel of salt fell on him causing such injuries as proved fatal 
to him. The court denied recovery because the intoxication of 
the deceased was a "remote" cause. The problem here involved 
was not one of causation, but a proper definition of the scope of 
the rule relied on by the plaintiff for protection. Was the 
statute intended to protect her interest against such a risk as 
this? The court's holding necessarily denied such protection. 
But other courts have held risks as "remote" as this one to fall 
within the protection of the statute.49 The only problem of any 
difficulty involved in this whole line of cases is that of defining 
the scope of the protection afforded by the statute. The question 
of causal connection is an incidental one and wherever made 
decisive constitutes a false issue.50 
47236 S W. 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). 
4853 Ind. 517 (1876). 
49 Mead v. Stratton, 87 N. Y. 493 (1882); Currier v. McKee, 99 Me. 
364, 59 Atl. 442 (1904). 
50 See Roach v. Kelly, 194 Pa. 24, 44 Atl. 1090 (1899); Gage v. Harvey, 
66 Ark. 68, 48 S. W. 898 (1898); Neu v. McKechnie, 95 N. Y. 632 (1884); 
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A truck driver, about his master's business, was caught out in 
a severe storm and, on acount of his exposure, pneumonia de- 
veloped. He sought recovery under the Workmen's Compensa- 
tion Act. There could be no doubt about the damage and the 
cause, but recovery was denied. The interest of the plaintiff 
was not given full protection; the risk is not within the purview 
of the statute.51 In Panama Railroad v. Rock,52 recovery 
for injuries resulting in death was denied under the Panama 
Code, although the language was broad enough to allow re- 
covery.53 
A railroad company failed to equip a car with automatic 
couplers as required by the safety appliance act. A brakeman, 
whose duty it was to stop a string of switched cars, failed to 
stop them in time to prevent a collision with a crippled car. 
His leg was crushed, while if the crippled car had been equipped 
with a coupler as required by law, his leg would not have been 
caught between the cars. The majority said that "the collision 
was not the proximate result of the defect . . . the colli- 
sion . . . cannot be attributed to a violation of the provi- 
sions of the law." 54 This was a wholly false issue. What the 
court should have held (and in fact did hold) was that the 
statute was not designed to protect against such a risk, i.e., a 
risk of personal injury on account of collision. The point is 
made clear by considering the cases relied on in the dissenting 
opinion. These were cases involving injuries which were 
clearly within the protection of the statute.55 The issue of causa- 
tion had no place in the discussion of this case if the court's 
interpretation of the statute was correct.56 
An act requiring vessels carrying livestock to be fitted out 
with pens of small dimensions to prevent a spread of infectious 
disease was not complied with by the defendant and during the 
voyage the plaintiff's sheep were swept overboard by a rough 
sea. Had the vessel been provided with pens such loss would 
not have been sustained. The plaintiff relied for recovery on 
Dennison v. Van Wormer, 107 Mich. 461, 65 N. W. 274 (1895); Minot v. 
Doherty, 203 Mass. 37, 89 N. E. 188 (1909). 
51 Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 265 S. W. 1027 (Tex. Comm. 
App. 1924); Landers v. City of Muskegon, 196 Mich. 750, 163 N. W. 43 
(1917); Hagrove v. Arnold Const. Co., 229 Mich. 678, 202 N. W. 918 (1925). 
52 266 U. S. 209, 45 Sup. Ct. 58 (1924). 
53 See (1924) 73 U. PA. L. REV. 215; (1925) 23 MICH. L. REV. 398; (1925) 
38 HARV. L. REV. 499. 
54 Lang v. New York Central R. R., 255 U. S. 455, 461, 41 Sup. Ct. 381, 
384 (1921). 
55 Louisville & N. R. R. v. Layton, 243 U. S. 617, 37 Sup. Ct. 456 (1917); 
Minneapolis & St. L. R. R. v. Gotschall, 244 U. S. 66, 37 Sup. Ct. 598 (1917). 
56 Glassey v. Worcester Ry., 185 Mass. 315, 70 N. E. 199 (1904) is sol- 
uble by a similar analysis; so is Smith v. Taylor-Button Co., 179 Wis. 
232, 190 N. W. 999 (1923). 
525 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.21 on Thu, 13 Jun 2013 16:58:21 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
YALE LAW JOURNAL 
the terms of the act. Kelly, C. B., said: 57 "But, looking at the 
Act, it is perfectly clear that its provisions were all enacted with 
a totally different view; there was no purpose, direct or indirect, 
to protect against such damage; but as is recited in the pre- 
amble, the Act is directed against the possibility of sheep or 
cattle being exposed to disease on the way to this country . . 
the damage complained of here is something totally apart from 
the object of the Act of Parliament, and it is in accordance with 
all the authorities to say that the action is not maintainable." 
Pigott, B.: 58 "Admit there has been a breach of duty; admit 
there has been a consequent injury; still the legislature was not 
legislating to protect against such an injury, but for an alto- 
gether different purpose; its object was not to regulate the duty 
of the carrier for all purposes, but only for one particular pur- 
pose." 
A statute required railroad companies to construct culverts 
to care for the drainage of adjacent land. The plaintiff in- 
voked this statute as a basis for liability for the drowning of his 
child in water accumulated on the right-of-way. The court 
denied recovery, saying: "The object of this statute was to pre- 
vent the railroad from unnecessarily interfering with the natural 
drainage of the land on either side of its right of way." 59 San 
Antonio Railway v. Behne,60 should have been decided on the 
same ground instead of on the false issue of proximate cause.61 
In Franklin v. Houston Electric Co.,62 the plaintiff alleged that 
the defendant, upon proper signal, negligently failed to stop its 
street car, as required by ordinance, to take him aboard as a 
passenger, and that by reason of such car passing by, the driver 
of an automobile following the car was so blinded by the dust 
that he could not stop his automobile before striking the plain- 
tiff. The court, in holding that a demurrer was properly sus- 
tained to the plaintiff's petition, said: 3 ". . . the automobile 
was an intervening cause between the alleged negligent act of the 
operative of the street car and the injury. The two acts had no 
causal connection. The most that can be said is, that the 
alleged negligent act of defendant's servant was a remote cause 
of the accident complained of, one which, by the weight of 
57 Gorris v. Scott, L. R. 9 Exch. 125, 129, 130 (1874). 
58 At 130. AcC: Bischof v. Illinois Southern Ry., 232 Ill. 446, 83 N. E. 
948 (1908); Frontier Steam Laundry v. Connolly, 72 Neb. 767, 101 N. W. 
995 (1904); Hocking Valley Ry. v. Phillips, 81 Ohio St. 453, 91 N. E. 118 
(1910). 
59 Dobbins v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 91 Tex. 60, 65, 41 S. W. 62, 64 (1897). 
60 231 S. W. 354 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921). 
61 See Green, Are Negligence and "Proximate" Cause Determinable by 
the Same Test (1923) 1 TEX. L. REV. 423, at 432. 
62286 S. W. 578 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). 
63 At 579. 
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authority, is held to be too remote to be classed as a proximate 
cause." 
There was no issue of causal connection in this case. That 
there was a very close causal relation is too clear for doubt. 
Likewise it was clear that the defendant violated the rule in- 
voked by the plaintiff, i.e., the defendant was negligent. The 
problem was the same whether the plaintiff relied on the viola- 
tion of a common law rule or the ordinance pleaded by him. It 
was whether the rule invoked by the plaintiff afforded protection 
against this sort of hazard. The court itself so recognized it 
in a later part of the opinion: 64 "Section 1287, requiring street 
cars to stop to take on and discharge passengers, was manifestly 
not intended to prevent injuries such as is complained of in the 
present case." This was the decisive point.65 Its solution de- 
pended upon far more subtle factors than causal connection. 
In Maskaliunas v. Chicago & W. I. R. R.,66 the plaintiff, a 
young boy, sought to recover for injuries received while trying to 
board a moving train operated by the defendant in the city of 
Chicago. Negligence was predicated on the defendant's failure 
to have its right-of-way fenced as required by a city ordinance. 
The court having held that the ordinance was for the protection 
of infants against such hazards (their own irresponsible tres- 
passes) and the jury having found causal connection between 
the failure to maintain a fence and plaintiff's injuries, judgment 
in the plaintiff's favor was affirmed. Again, the decisive ques- 
tion was the scope of protection afforded by the rule infracted 
by the defendant. 
The same process is inevitable in suits based upon the rules 
of the common law. The fact that the rule is statutory or of 
common law origin can make no difference. 
A plaintiff was hurt by reason of a defective wheel of an 
automobile in which he was riding. He purchased the car 
from a retail dealer, but he sued the manufacturer with whom 
he had no contract relation and alleged its negligence in failing 
to inspect the car properly. The question was whether the plain- 
tiff's right to be free from bodily harm was within the protection 
of the rule of law here invoked, i.e., the duty on the part of the 
manufacturer to inspect. It was decided in favor of the plain- 
tiff.67 The whole line of cases involving the liability of a manu- 
facturer to third persons presents the same problem.68 
A similar question arises in carrier cases in which, owing to 
the delay of the carrier, a shipment of goods is overtaken and 
64 At 580. 
65 Stephens v. Oklahoma City Ry., 28 Okla. 340, 114 Pac. 611 (1911) is 
subject to a similar criticism. 
66318 Ill. 142, 149 N. E. 23 (1925). 
67 McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916). 
68 See also Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922). 
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destroyed by unusual natural phenomena, such as a cyclone, 
earthquake, lightning or unprecedented flood-ordinarily denom- 
inated "acts of God." Here the defendant is a wrongdoer, dam- 
ages have resulted, and the delay has at least contributed some- 
thing to the damage. But is the risk of encountering such pheno- 
mena one within the scope of the rule of law which makes delay 
a wrong? Prompt shipjnent is required to protect against the 
risks incurred by not unusual weather conditions, deterioration, 
market fluctuations and the like, but not against all risks and es- 
pecially those which in the affairs of men are so unusual that 
they are ordinarily not guarded against at all and which are 
not thought of as sufficiently serious to take into account. Hence, 
the carrier is not required to fashion his conduct as to these 
unusual risks. The law affords the shipper no protection against 
them. The rule invoked is not designed to protect against a 
Galveston storm,69 while it might be held to afford protection 
against floods in the Mississippi Valley where even "unusual" 
floods are of more or less frequent occurrence. Different courts 
might well differ on the same facts. In fact, there is a tendency 
in some jurisdictions to extend protection against some of these 
risks,70 while in other jurisdictions protection is denied.7 
D shot P's dog.72 The dog rushed into the house and upset P, 
causing her physical injuries. P sued D for injuries to her person. 
P relied upon the rule that D was an intentional wrongdoer, and 
was therefore responsible for all injuries resulting from his con- 
duct. D was an intentional wrongdoer as to the property in- 
terest and was responsible for all damages that his conduct caused 
the dog. But could P rely upon such a rule to support recovery 
for the injuries done her person? The Vermont court errone- 
ously so decided. The rule of law invoked that a person shall 
not commit a trespass upon the property of another is not de- 
signed to protect against personal injuries unless such trespass 
is reasonably to be considered a trespass to the plaintiff's per- 
son.73 Hence, if P is to recover in the case supposed, she should 
invoke another rule, viz., that a person shall act with reasonable 
care if under all the circumstances his conduct is reasonably 
69 International & G. N. Ry. v. Bergman, 64 S. W. 999 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1901). 
70 Green-Wheeler Shoe Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 130 Iowa, 123, 
106 N. W. 498 (1906); Fox v. Boston & M. Ry., 148 Mass. 220, 19 N. E. 
222 (1889); Bibb Broom Corn Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 94 Minn. 
269, 102 N. W. 709 (1905). 
71 Rodgers v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 75 Kan. 222, 88 Pac. 885 (1907); Denny v. 
New York Cent. Ry., 13 Gray, 481 (1859). 
72 Isham v. Dow's Estate, 70 Vt. 588, 41 Atl. 585 (1898). 
73 Lambrecht v. Schreyer, 129 Minn. 271, 152 N. W. 645 (1915); Clark 
v. Downing, 55 Vt. 259 (1882). 
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calculated to cause injury to another.74 Should D have reason- 
ably foreseen as not unlikely that by shooting P's dog he would 
cause P physical injury? If so, then since such injury has ac- 
tually been occasioned by his conduct, D must be held account- 
able. P really has two causes of action against D. They are 
based upon different interests, and a different rule of law must 
be relied upon for recovery in each case. This being recognized, 
nothing remains to make them more difficult than any other 
ordinary tort case. 
A similar case is presented in Bigham v. T. & P. Railway.75 
There the defendant failed to place a proper latch on its pen 
for loading cattle. A passing train caused the cattle to stampede. 
They rushed through the gate and over P who was attempting 
to fasten it. He suffered both a property loss and injuries to 
his person. He sought recovery for both. Clearly the duty 
to provide the gate with a latch was for the protection of P's 
property interest. The court had no difficulty with that phase 
of the case. But the court had great difficulty with the suit for 
personal injuries. It ought to have been readily seen that the 
rule of law invoked by P to vindicate his property interest was 
not designed to protect P's person. Had the court recognized 
this preliminary problem, it would have never reached the issue 
of causation. As a matter of fact, the issue of causation was as 
clear in this branch of the case as in the other branch. But the 
plaintiff was properly denied recovery for his personal injuries 
because his bodily security was not an interest which the rule 
of law invoked was designed to protect. 
In Bosch v. Burlington & Missouri R. Railway,76 the plaintiff 
sought to recover against the defendant for entering upon and 
occupying with buildings, tracks and cars certain streets be- 
tween the plaintiff's property and the river, on account of which 
obstructions, the fire department was unable to reach the water 
in the river so as to prevent destruction of the plaintiff's build- 
ings by a fire which had originated in an adjoining block. The 
court held that the defendant's wrongful acts were "too remote 
to be made the basis of recovery." The plaintiff's interest or right 
in the street was admittedly prejudiced by the defendant and 
the plaintiff could have recovered for this wrong. But the pro- 
tection afforded the plaintiff to this right was not designed to 
give him the further protection against the hazard of fire. Ex- 
pressed differently, taking possession of and obstructing the 
streets, while a wrong toward the plaintiff, did not subject the 
74 Heaven v. Pender, L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 503 (1883); McPherson v. Buick 
Motor Co., supra note 67. 
5 90 Tex. 223, 38 S. W. 162 (1896). Cf. Eckert v. Long Island Railway, 
43 N. Y. 502 (1870). 
7644 Iowa, 402 (1876). 
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defendant to the risk of becoming liable for a fire hazard, at 
least for such originating on other premises. The issue was not 
one of causation but whether the rule of law invoked by the 
plaintiff was designed to protect against the hazard in question. 
Under some conditions, it might well be held that such a risk is 
within the range of the rule protecting a person's right in an 
unobstructed street adjacent to his premises. But such a ques- 
tion is one of policy to be determined upon the consideration 
of many factors. Clearly it is not one of causation. 
In Central of Georgia Railway v. Price,77 the plaintiff was car- 
ried beyond her destination due to the negligence of the defen- 
dant's conductor. The latter made provision for her to spend the 
night at a hotel and to return on the morning train at the expense 
of the defendant. During the night a lamp which the plaintiff 
left burning in her room exploded and caused her physical in- 
juries for which she sought to recover. The court denied re- 
covery on the ground that the wrong of the defendant was not 
the proximate cause of her injury but the injury was caused by 
an intervening negligent hotel keeper. The decisive question was 
not one of causation, for having to remain in the hotel as a result 
of the defendant's negligence was a factor producing her injury. 
The plaintiff's right or interest was to be carried to the point of 
her destination without hurt by the defendant. But this interest 
is not given absolute protection. Neither the scope of protection 
given the plaintiff nor the extent of the defendant's liability 
covered everything which could conceivably cause the plaintiff 
harm. The court's duty in this case was to define the scope of 
the protection given to the plaintiff, the extent of the risk on 
the defendant under its undertaking. The only manner in which 
a cause issue could have become pertinent was by considering 
whether the defendant's negligence, as a factor in comparison 
with the other operative factors, really contributed appreciably 
to the injury. While this might have become an issue, still so 
long as the more important problem of determining the scope 
of the protection to which the plaintiff was entitled was unsolved, 
the cause element was immaterial. 
In Clark v. Gay,78 the defendant pursued a servant of the plain- 
tiff into his house and killed the servant in the presence of the 
plaintiff's family. The family refused to occupy the house 
further. The plaintiff sought to recover from the defendant the 
value of his house. There is no question of cause here. Whether 
rational or not, the result was that for household purposes the 
house was no longer of value to the plaintiff. The question was 
whether this interest of the plaintiff in his property was pro- 
tected by the rule invoked. Was this a risk incurred by the de- 
77106 Ga. 176, 32 S. E. 77 (1898). 
78112 Ga. 777, 38 S. E. 81 (1901). 
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fendant's commission of the murder? The court, in denying 
recovery, held not. The rule invoked by the plaintiff was lacking 
in reach. 
In Elliott v. Allegheny County Light Co.,79 a ladder on which 
the plaintiff was standing while painting slipped and caused him 
to fall. He clutched an electric light wire attached to the side 
of the building and, due to lack of proper insulation of the wire, 
was shocked and burned. He was denied recovery on the ground 
that the proximate cause of his injuries was his fall and not the 
uninsulated wire. This conclusion blinks the facts. The wire 
was clearly a substantial cause factor. The only question was 
whether the plaintiff's interest in his bodily security was pro- 
tected by the rule which required the defendant to use care in 
maintaining its wire in good condition. Should the defendant 
in maintaining its wire be put under the risk of liability to one 
in the plaintiff's position? The conclusion of the court is ques- 
tionable. If the real issue had been considered, the result might 
well have been different. 
In Ryan v. New York Central Railway,80 a railroad by its neg- 
ligence set fire to its own property. From this the fire ignited 
and destroyed Ryan's house situated on an adjacent lot. The 
court thought that the damage was remote, i. e., the causation 
was too dim. The rule is admittedly arbitrary,81 and to make 
such a problem one of causation is to cast aside common intelli- 
gence. The only meaning of the decision is that adjacent prop- 
erty interests are not fully protected by the rule of law requiring 
reasonable care in handling fire. Protection is afforded only to 
the owner whose property is fired first hand by the defendant's 
wrongful conduct. The court said as much in substance, but its 
opinion is subject to several interpretations. The rule is not 
followed generally.82 
In Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. New York, N. H. 
& H. Railway,83 the plaintiff sought to recover from the defend- 
ant the amount of a policy which the plaintiff had paid to the 
beneficiary on account of the negligent killing of the insured. 
The court refused to give protection to the insurance company's 
interest in the life of its policy holder and denied a recovery. The 
court indicated that the loss was a "remote and indirect" conse- 
quence of the misconduct of the defendant and the case has been 
considered as an instance of remote causation. This was er- 
79 204 Pa. 568, 54 Atl. 278 (1903); see Hope v. Edison Light Co., 284 Pa. 
112, 130 Atl. 309 (1925) for a similar case. 80 35 N. Y. 209 (1866). Also see Moore v. Van Buren and N. Y. Bill 
Posting Co., 240 N. Y. 673, 148 N. E. 753 (1925). 81 Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224 N. Y. 47, 120 N. E. 86; 
(1918). 
82 Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469 (1876). 83 25 Conn. 265 (1856). 
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roneous. The element of causation was present, but the common 
law, as in many cases, does not recognize such an interest as 
deserving of protection against this sort of hazard, nor does 
the statute permitting a recovery for death by wrongful act ex- 
tend protection to it.84 
In suits for injuries resulting from fright or nervous shock in 
the absence of physical impact, some courts refuse recovery al- 
together, while if there is the slightest physical impact recovery 
will be allowed.85 So long as this is done on the basis that the 
interest or right of a person to be free from bodily harm caused 
by the failure to use care on the part of a defendant is not given 
full protection, but protection is only accorded in certain cases, 
i. e., when the interest is injured in a certain manner, the de- 
cisions are intelligible. But when recovery is denied in such 
cases on the ground that the element of causation is lacking or 
is remote, such decisions can only be attributed to a failure to 
understand the true character of the cause problem.86 The doc- 
trine denying recovery in such cases is really based on a so-called 
public policy, a balancing of interests, with the conclusion that 
it is better to deny protection to the interest involved under such 
circumstances than it is to undertake to give compensation under 
all the difficulties of the case.87 
In Wineberg v. Dubois Borough,ss the plaintiff's knee was in- 
jured by reason of her falling from a board walk negligently main- 
tained along a public street. Before she fully recovered she suf- 
fered further injuries by reason of a second fall which she was 
unable to prevent on account of her leg being stiff. The trial 
court's charge permitted her to recover for the second injuries 
if the jury found they were proximately caused by the negligence 
of the defendant in causing the first fall. The appellate court 
held there was no relation of cause and effect between the two 
falls and denied recovery for the second injuries. Whatever may 
be the decisive issue here as the case is presented, it is not a 
lack of causal connection. It would seem that the only problem 
is whether the protection afforded by law to the plaintiff against 
the negligence of the town in maintaining its sidewalk extends to 
subsequent injuries even though they be a result of the injuries 
first received. The scope of the protection given by any rule 
must have a boundary; the risk under which a defendant is 
placed must have a limit. This problem, however phrased, is one 
of balancing of interests. Should not the court have faced it 
84 Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754 (1877). 
85 Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897). 
86 Bucknam v. Great Northern Ry., 76 Minn. 373, 79 N. W. 98 (1899). 
87 See, generally, Throckmorton, Damages for Fright (1921) 34 HARV. L. 
REV. 260; Wilson, The New York Rule as to Nervous Shock (1926) 11 
CORN. L. Q. 512. 
88 209 Pa. 430, 58 Atl. 807 (1904). 
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squarely and declared as a practical matter that in such a case 
as this the limit of responsibility, irrespective of cause, is the 
damage done in the primary instance? 89 
In Scheffer v. Railway,90 the plaintiff alleged that as a 
result of a wreck caused by the negligent collision of the de- 
fendant's trains, Scheffer, deceased, was so injured in body and 
mind that he took his own life. The court sustained a demurrer 
to the declaration, holding the defendant's negligence too remote. 
Surely causal connection was not wanting in the allegations. 
Had imbecility or tuberculosis resulted from the injuries re- 
ceived, the court would not have reached such a conclusion. If 
the deceased, while in a delirium as a result of his injuries, had 
torn off his bandages and infected his wounds so that blood 
poisoning had set in, no such conclusion would have been 
reached.91 The meaning of the decision is merely that this char- 
acter of result is not within the protection of the rule of law 
relied on by the plaintiff. Suicide as a result of a deranged men- 
tal condition is not a risk which a defendant incurs by negligently 
hurting another. The question is not one of causal connection, 
but one of fixing the boundaries of a legal rule, and it is doubt- 
ful that such are correctly marked out in this instance.92 There 
is no such holding under the Workmen's Compensation Act.93 
In Clark v. Wallace,94 the plaintiff's employee in charge of cer- 
tain sheep and unharvested feed was called away to assist a 
neighbor-the defendant. While away, fire started by the em- 
ployee's wife got beyond control and consumed the feed in the 
field. The plaintiff sought to recover damages on account of its 
loss. Recovery was denied on the ground that the absence of the 
employee was not a proximate cause of the loss. This was at 
least a doubtful issue. The controlling issue, however, was 
whether the invasion of the plaintiff's interest by calling away 
his employee devolved such a risk upon the defendant. Did 
such hazard fall within the scope of the rule which prohibited 
the defendant from interfering with the duties of plaintiff's 
workman? A consideration of this issue would no doubt have 
made it more difficult to decide that the defendant was under no 
duty. And, having decided it affirmatively, the issue of causation 
would have probably been decided differently. 
89 See Hoseth v. Preston Mill Co., 49 Wash. 682, 96 Pac. 423 (1908); 
Wagner v. Mittendorf, 232 N. Y. 481, 134 N. E. 539 (1922). 90 105 U. S. 249 (1881). 
91 Daniels v. New York, N. H. & H. Ry., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N. E. 424 
(1903). 
92 See Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); (1922) 1 TEX. 
'L. REV. 114. 
93 Malone v. Cayzer, Irvine & Co., 45 Scot. L. R. 351 (1908). 
94 51 Colo. 437, 118 Pac. 973 (1911). 
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SUMMARY 
So far the attempt has been merely to clear the way for a 
serious attack upon the principal redoubts of "proximate" cause 
which are to be found in negligence cases. But even at this 
stage it should be clear that it is in connection with the problem 
of defining the scope of protection given to any interest that 
the courts are prone to seek relief in that vague conception of 
"legal cause" or "proximate cause" as opposed to causal con- 
nection as we speak of it generally. Moreover, if there is any 
warrant for this elusive phrase it is in this connection. It must 
be clear, also, that for the purposes required, such conception is 
entirely too restrictive unless given a weighted meaning incom- 
parably broader and deeper than the words themselves ordin- 
arily signify. But if given such weighted meaning, it then is 
something entirely different from cause in the sense of "cause 
and effect" which is also an element of legal liability. Either 
we must recognize at least two kinds of "cause" meaning en- 
tirely different things, as has already been developed by the 
courts, or else we must find some way in which to relieve the 
term of this weighted meaning. It is thought that the analysis 
here suggested does this and thereby makes clear the problems 
which are involved so that they can be dealt with rationally. 
Such an analysis does not solve the problem. It does have the 
advantage, however, of indicating what the problem is, draw- 
ing attention to the factors involved, leaving to the judge at 
least the opportunity to appreciate the high function his judicial 
power must perform. 
In extreme cases the process is readily observable. When a 
statute is invoked, for example, the court must first inquire 
whether the statute covers this kind of case. Was the statute 
designed to give protection against this sort of hazard? The 
court will ordinarily consider innumerable factors in reaching 
a conclusion on this kind of problem, but if it decides the statute 
does not cover the case, the litigation is ended. While if the 
decision is otherwise on this point, then the court faces the 
further problems of determining whether the defendant violated 
the statute, and what items of loss the plaintiff was caused by 
such infraction. 
Likewise, when the court is faced with a case based on a 
common law rule it is believed the same process is involved. 
Is there any reason for thinking that it is not? The difficulties 
may be very much greater, however. Assuming that the court 
in such a case accurately perceives the interest which has been 
injured, and the hazard which has befallen such interest has 
been ascertained, it is still very probable that, except in the clear- 
est cases, the rule relied on will not stand out with such bold- 
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ness and uncertainty as a statutory rule. But this difficulty does 
not do away with the necessity either for invoking a proper 
rule in vindication of the injury incurred or for determining the 
range of such rule. This is as important in the administration 
of justice as that the interest itself be a protected one. It is 
no more possible to vindicate an injury to an interest caused by 
deceit by invoking a rule prohibiting battery than it is to vin- 
dicate the public's interest against murder by relying on a breach 
of contract. The court, therefore, cannot escape the necessity 
of outlining or defining in every case the rule relied on so that 
it may appear clearly enough for the court both to determine 
its appropriateness and to measure its bounds. Otherwise, its 
judgment as to whether the particular hazard falls within the 
reach of the rule will have the same haziness as the conception 
of the rule itself. All of these are steps necessary to be taken 
preliminarily to the court's decision as to whether the rule 
covers such a case. Only after it has so answered does it be- 
come necessary to go further and determine whether the de- 
fendant violated such a rule; and if so, what the items of loss are 
which the violation caused the plaintiff to suffer. 
No doubt the most difficult step in the process preliminary to 
making a decision on a problem of this nature is the definite 
articulation of the rule relied on in a particular case.95 In most 
instances, perhaps, this is done without consciously taking the 
step, for most cases are of a normal or standardized type, re- 
quiring no conscious consideration. But in the unusual or off- 
type case the problem cannot be so handled. There, no tracks 
have been made for the judge to follow, and the precision with 
which he deals with the problem is decisive. If he fails to recog- 
nize it, ignores it, blurs it, or shifts it under any guise to the 
jury, we may expect irrational results. Ordinarily the problem 
is dealt with so as to reach satisfactory results except in negli- 
gence cases. There, due to the many complexities which arise 
from other problems, as later to be developed, little understand- 
ing of the vital part which should be played by this factor in the 
determination of legal liability has been indicated in the opinions 
of the courts. 
95 Professor Bingham makes a very similar approach to the problem by 
requiring the court to define the scope of the duty of a defendant. He 
suggests that duties are always concrete while a rule or principle of law is 
an abstraction, a generalization drawn from a number of decided cases and 
that it can never be defined except in terms of concrete duty. The differ- 
ence is not thought to be a material one. It is the old problem of which 
was first, the hen or the egg. We constantly employ both terms and for a 
particular case it is perhaps no more difficult to define the rule than to 
define the duty. The process is the same. In one, it is to determine whether 
the hazard created by defendant's conduct falls within the scope or range of 
the rule invoked; in the other, to determine whether the conduct of defend- 
ant falls within the scope of his legal duty which is claimed to have been 
violated. Much if not all that is contended for by Professor Bingham, save 
the terminology, gives support to our suggestion. See his very incisive and 
rational discussion in 9 COL. L. REV. 16-23. 
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